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Over the past decades, cognitive neuroscience has witnessed a shift from predominantly
disembodied and computational views of the mind, to more embodied and situated views
of the mind. These postulate that mental functions cannot be fully understood without
reference to the physical body and the environment in which they are experienced. Within
the field of contemplative science, the directing of attention to bodily sensations has so
far mainly been studied in the context of seated meditation and mindfulness practices.
However, the cultivation of interoceptive, proprioceptive and kinesthetic awareness is also
said to lie at the core of many movement-based contemplative practices such as Yoga,
Qigong, and Tai Chi. In addition, it likely plays a key role in the efficacy of modern somatic
therapeutic techniques such as the Feldenkrais Method and the Alexander Technique.
In the current paper we examine how these practices are grounded in the concepts of
embodiment, movement and contemplation, as we look at them primarily through the
lens of an enactive approach to cognition. Throughout, we point to a series of challenges
that arise when Western scientists study practices that are based on a non-dualistic view
of mind and body.
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INTRODUCTION
Compared to the extensive body of work on mindfulness-based
practices, far fewer scientific studies have examined the mech-
anisms underlying movement-based embodied contemplative
practices such as Yoga or Qigong. One likely reason is the inher-
ent challenge of dealing with their multifaceted nature, typi-
cally involving specific movement sequences, specialized use of
the breath, and modulation of attention (Wayne and Kaptchuk,
2008). Movement-based practices have, however, been shown
to alleviate the symptoms of various clinical conditions (Jahnke
et al., 2010; Wren et al., 2011), and elicit measurable changes in
physiological stress markers (Lee et al., 2004; West et al., 2004),
cognitive functioning (Manjunath and Telles, 2001; Silva et al.,
2007), sensorimotor acuity (Kerr et al., 2008), as well as emotional
states in healthy populations (Chattha et al., 2008). An impor-
tant challenge for contemplative scientists is therefore to advance
our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these complex
practices. But what exactly constitutes amovement-based embod-
ied contemplative practice (MECP)? Contemplative movement
systems exist in almost all cultures of the world—from shaman-
istic dances, Christian liturgical gestures, and Eastern spiritual
practices, to modern Western somatic practices. The initial chal-
lenge in looking at these systems is one of providing a taxonomy
that is appropriate both to the systems themselves and to thor-
ough scientific investigation. Whether a system is embodied or
not, whether it is movement-based or not, and whether it is
contemplative or not, are all relevant distinctions, so let us look
at each of these aspects separately.
EMBODIED
Over the past decades, cognitive neuroscience has witnessed a
shift from predominantly abstract and computational views of the
mind, to more embodied and situated views of the mind.
Francisco Varela (Varela et al., 1991) was one of the first to
introduce the term “embodied mind” into cognitive neuroscience
as a counter to the concept of a “disembodied mind,” a mental
entity considered independently of its relationship to a body and
the environment (for further perspectives see (Wilson, 2002), and
(Ziemke, 2003). According to the “enactive approach” to cogni-
tion (Thompson and Varela, 2001; Thompson, 2005; Di Paolo
and Thompson, 2014), living beings are autonomous agents that
actively generate and maintain their physical and psychological
identities, and that enact their cognitive domains through their
activities. As such, the enactive approach postulates that human
beings exists intrinsically as embodied beings, and that mental
functions such as perception, cognition and motivation, cannot
be fully understood without reference to the physical body as well
as the environment in which they are experienced (Varela et al.,
1991; Thompson, 2007).
The closely related “grounded theory” of cognition (Barsalou,
2008) posits that cognition (including abstract thought, con-
ceptual knowledge and semantic memory) is grounded in the
brain’s modal sensory systems, rather than being merely based on
abstract computations. Similarly, the dynamical systems approach
to developmental theory (Camras and Witherington, 2005), psy-
choanalysis (Krueger, 2002) as well as the newly emerging body-
oriented methods of psychotherapy (Heller, 2012), all emphasize
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that bodily sensory systems are the first to develop and that they
play a fundamental role in the formation of the sense of self
(Sheets-Johnstone, 1999). In sum, all these schools of thought
converge on the fact that the experience of one’s self in the world
as a cognizant being does not solely emerge from neural activity
within the brain. Instead, it involves a complex interplay of brain,
body and environment, and the seamless integration of intero-
ceptive, proprioceptive (including vestibular), kinesthetic, tactile,
and spatial information (Ehrsson, 2007; Haselager et al., 2012;
Ionta et al., 2011).
Within the field of contemplative science, the process of
becoming reflectively attentive to bodily sensations and sensory
experiences has so far been primarily studied in the context of
seated meditation and mindfulness-based practices (Didonna,
2009). However, it is certainly at the core of many movement-
based practices as well. In fact, systems such as Hatha Yoga,
Qigong, Tai Chi, the Alexander Technique, and the Feldenkrais
Method (see Supplementary Material for a brief description of
these systems), all involve an explicit emphasis on attending to
interoceptive, proprioceptive and kinesthetic qualities of experi-
ence. They also use concepts such as “being in one’s body” to
encourage an embodied experience of the self.
MOVEMENT-BASED
One of the central motivations of examining movement within
the context of contemplative practices can be related to the
enactive approach described above. Movement is a fundamen-
tal characteristic of the embodied state, and the enactive as well
as the grounded cognition approaches propose that the individ-
ual’s capacity for self-movement and its underlying sensorimo-
tor substrates are a constitutive part of all cognitive processes
(Thompson and Varela, 2001; Barsalou, 2008). In addition, they
propose that any embodied activity, including cognitive processes,
takes the form of sensorimotor coupling with the environment.
What a living organism senses and perceives is a function of
how it moves, and how a living organism moves is a function
of what it senses and perceives (Maturana and Varela, 1987).
Along similar lines, Llinás (2002) echoes Sperry’s earlier asser-
tion (Sperry, 1952) that movement is the principal function of
the nervous system, and that most advanced functions of the
cortex can be seen as elaborations of the basic need to move
toward or away from environmental stimuli. The word “emo-
tion” is derived from the Old French “emouvoir” (“to stir up or
agitate”), and from the Latin roots “ex-” (out) and “-movere”
(to move). Similarly, the word “attention” is derived from the
root “ten” (“to stretch out toward”) (Partridge, 1966). In that
sense, feeling attracted or repulsed from something, or even
directing or withdrawing ones attention from something, can be
seen as subtle forms of movement (Day, 1964; Sheets-Johnstone,
1999).
For the most part, MECPs are based on internally generated
self-willed movement (Krieghoff et al., 2011), and practitioners
guide and adjust their movement based on subtle feedback from
joints and muscles (Scott, 2012). Such voluntary and actively
initiated movement, as opposed to externally evoked or purely
passively imposed motion, is intrinsic to the sense of agency
(Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012), which in turn is central to the
development of the sense of self (Thelen and Fogel, 1989). Given
their emphasis on carefully executed intentional movements, we
speculate that MECPs can be a tool for restructuring an individ-
ual’s sense of agency, and consequently impact the exploration
and transformation their sense of self. There are, however, also
forms of MECPs that involve spontaneous movement that is
not controlled voluntarily (e.g., Spontaneous Qigong, Tandava,
Shaktipat, Katsugen-Kai, Latihan, and Kundalini (Louchakova
and Warner, 2003). Such practices involve putting oneself into a
state of receptivity and surrendering to the spontaneous move-
ment that arises. Overtly, these movements may resemble animal
movements, Taijiquan forms, or Yoga asanas and mudras. In
other cases however, the “movement” is purely internal, involv-
ing vivid interior sensations of heat, vibration, “energy” cur-
rents, and even changes in experienced bodily shape and spatial
extension. During infant development, spontaneous involun-
tary movement precedes controlled voluntary movement and the
development of a sense of agency (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999). That
is, an infant’s experience of “movement occurs” precedes the
experience of “I move” (Haselager et al., 2012). We suggest that
MECPs involving spontaneous movement may therefore allow a
constructive regression to early stages of development of volun-
tary motor control, and a consequent re-modeling of the sense
of agency.
Asian movement-based practices such as Ashtanga Vinyasa
Yoga (Jois, 1999) or Taijiquan (Jou and Shapiro, 1983) obviously
involve overt voluntary physical motion, and strongly empha-
size specific forms and qualities of movement. However, let us
consider this quote from Yiquan master Wang Xiangzhai: “One
should know that a big movement is not as good as a small move-
ment, a small movement is not as good as stillness, one must
know that only stillness is the endless movement.” (Wang, 2005).
In Qigong practice, as in the internal martial arts, there is often
a progression from an overt large motion, to a very small and
subtle motion, to a purely internal or imagined movement—and
this last is regarded as the most effective (as well as the most
difficult) way of moving the “Qi” (life energy). So what needs
to move, and to what extent does the movement need to be
overtly evident, in order for a practice to qualify as movement-
based? Here we propose the idea of extending the concept of
“movement-based” so as to include very subtle, and even imag-
ined, movement. This idea is supported by our knowledge of
the neural mechanisms underlying motor control (Scott, 2012)
and motor imagery (Schuster et al., 2011). Every execution of
an overt movement controlled by the primary motor cortex is
preceded by activations in premotor and supplementary motor
areas. This preparatory phase has the purpose of organizing
the movement by setting the appropriate posture, muscle tone
and autonomic tone, and allow for integration of information
from other cortical regions (e.g., visual, somatosensory, execu-
tive, affective and motivational) into the intended motor action
(Wolpert et al., 2011). Moreover, premotor, supplementary motor
as well as cerebellar areas are strongly activated during motor
imagery without any actual physical movement (Gerardin et al.,
2000), which in itself can improve motor skills and even physical
strength (Yue and Cole, 1992; Sharma et al., 2006; Schuster et al.,
2011). Qigong uses a technique very similar to motor imagery
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referred to as “moving the Qi.” It consists of moving one’s atten-
tion through the body so as to create a sensation of a flowing
current of energy (Johnson et al., 2000). This form of practice
is regarded by most practitioners as essential to the benefits of
Qigong. We postulate that such subtle movement may have the
effect of re-programming counterproductive patterns of intention
and action by bringing the process of initiating action up to full
consciousness.
At this point it might appear that every contemplative prac-
tice involves movement to some extent, and in fact we would
argue that this is the case. Even in the most static forms of
seated meditation the whole body is in constant subtle motion
with the rhythm of the breath. That said however, we pro-
pose to define a movement-based practice as one in which the
principal focus is on the intentional induction, or the inten-
tional disinhibition, of overt movement or subtle internal sen-
sations of movement. This definition excludes simply watching
the breath while seated, unless specific emphasis is put on cul-
tivating attention to the subtle movement that accompanies
the breath.
CONTEMPLATIVE
In recent scientific explorations of contemplative practices, the
terms “contemplation” and “meditation” have often been used
interchangeably. The dictionary definition of contemplation
includes both secular and religious meanings, referring to
sustained attention and deep consideration of an object of interest
that is often used in the context of religious or spiritual experi-
ence. The root of the word is the same as that of “temple”—“tem”
or “to cut”—implying the concept of “carving out” a special time
and place apart from daily preoccupations (Partridge, 1966). The
wordmeditation has its origins in the Indo-European root “med,”
implying the concepts “to measure,” “to consider,” or “to think
about.” In Western Christian tradition “contemplation” refers to
non-conceptual awareness of the Divine, whereas “meditation”
carries the implication of conceptual, thought-based considera-
tion of religious ideas. In the encounter betweenWestern thought
and Asian religions however, the English word meditation has
come to be used to denote a wide range of diverse practices (for a
discussion of this issue in relation to early Buddhist writings see
Brooks, 2004).
A theoretical approach that is fundamental to the investigation
of contemplative and meditative practices is neurophenomenol-
ogy (Varela, 1996; Lutz and Thompson, 2003), an offshoot of
the enactive approach described above. Neurophenomenology
emerged out of the need to make systematic use of first-person
methods and introspective phenomenological reports in the study
of subjective conscious experience, and to relate the information
gathered through those methods to complex dynamical systems
analysis of brain activity. First-person methods, whether phe-
nomenological, meditative or psychotherapeutic, are specifically
aimed at increasing an individual’s sensitivity to the quality of
their experience from moment to moment. As a result, they have
the potential to enable tacit, pre-verbal and pre-reflective aspects
of the experience that typically remain merely “lived through,” to
become subjectively accessible. First-person methods exist within
several contemplative practices and traditions that systematically
cultivate the capacity for attentive self-awareness. While the indi-
vidual practices differ in terms of specifically adopted techniques,
they typically involve a disciplined process of becoming reflec-
tively attentive to experience. In phenomenology this process is
known as “epoché” (Husserl, 2012), and is described as three
intertwining phases that form a dynamic cycle. In a nutshell, the
three phases consist of suspension of habitual thoughts, redi-
rection of attention to the experience itself, and receptivity to
whatever arises from it (Depraz et al., 2000). In the context of
MECPs, the redirection of attention predominantly entails cul-
tivating awareness of bodily sensations and proprioceptive feed-
back related to the specifically employedmovement and breathing
techniques.
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in trying
to understand the neural mechanisms underlying contempla-
tive states. In fact, mindfulness-based meditation practices are
now known to engage selective brain areas and neural networks
involved in attention, body awareness, emotion regulation and
the sense of self (Hölzel et al., 2011; Kerr et al., 2013). In addition,
meditative practices have also been found to be typically associ-
ated with altered activation of the so-called default mode network
(DMN) (Raichle et al., 2001), and enhanced connectivity between
cortical regions implicated in self-monitoring and cognitive con-
trol (Brewer et al., 2011). The DMN is known to be involved in the
construction of the “autobiographical self,” and the assessment of
stimuli for their relevance to the mentally sustained image of one-
self. The altered activity of the DMN during meditative states has
therefore been proposed to underlie a shift to less self-centered
and more objective awareness of interoceptive as well as extero-
ceptive sensory events (Brewer et al., 2011). To which extent these
finding also relate to MECPs remains an open question. Yoga
and Qigong are broad and multifaceted categories, both includ-
ing a range of “meditative movement” practices (Larkey et al.,
2009), which are typically complemented by seated meditation
techniques. Hence, while many of the already formulated theories
about the mechanisms underlying traditional mindfulness-based
practices might also apply to MECPs, it can also be assumed that
MECPs may involve additional distinct mechanisms. Specifically,
since movement increases the intensity of proprioceptive stimuli
(Prochazka, 2011), it is possible that MECPs may offer a more
efficient form of practice than seated meditation when it comes
to cultivating bodily awareness and the sense of self.
Regardless of the specific underlying mechanisms, for most
practitioners of MECPs contemplation represents the cultivation
of sustained attention and equanimity (Desbordes et al., 2014),
that for some has the ultimate aim of transforming habitual self-
identity (akin to most seated meditation practices). However,
MECPs can also be practiced without specific reference to altered
self-identity as such. For example, Hatha Yoga can be practiced as
a form of physical therapy, or Taijiquan purely as a martial art.
Whether in such cases these types of practices can still be defined
as contemplative remains subject to interpretation. In any case,
the wide spectrum of potential applications of MECPs underlines
the importance of documenting precisely which of their compo-
nent parts are emphasized within a specific intervention—not
only for the sake of scientific clarity, but out of respect to the
systems themselves.
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ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
So far we have referred to MECPs as performed by an individ-
ual person. However, there are also forms of MECPs involving
two people. The relationship between these two may be that of
master and disciple, teacher and student, therapist and client, or
co-practitioners. Together, they enter a state of enhanced connec-
tivity referred to as “resonance” (Siegel, 2007; Nummenmaa et al.,
2012). In this state there is a largely automatically occurring shar-
ing of affective and somatosensory experience, said to also involve
a simultaneous activation of affective and sensory brain structures
in both individuals. These phenomena have been documented in
recent research in social neuroscience (Singer and Lamm, 2009).
This form of dyadic contemplation is at the core of many Eastern
movement-based systems (Wallace, 2001), as well as Western sys-
tems such as the Feldenkrais Method, the Alexander Technique,
and body-oriented psychotherapy.
A further example of a novel therapeutic system that might fall
into the category of MECPs is Somatic Experiencing (SE). Based
on observations of how animals in the wild recover from trauma,
its principal method is based on attention to bodily (interocep-
tive, proprioceptive, kinesthetic, tactile and spatial) sensations
(Levine, 1997). According to SE theory, it is proposed that the
practitioner is guided by the resonant relationship and verbally
leads the client into internal and external movement, enabling a
rebalancing of the autonomic nervous system (Levine, 2010).
CONCLUSION
As pointed out in a seminal article by Kerr (2002) and more
recently by Payne and Crane-Godreau (2013), several challenges
arise when Western scientists study practices that stem from
ancient Eastern traditions. These authors underline the impor-
tance of having a thorough understanding of a system in its own
terms before attempting to interpret it from a modern scientific
perspective. They point out the risk of attempting to shoehorn
a system into an already existing conceptual framework, which
often eliminates the possibility of genuinely new discovery.
So what does it mean to look for the mechanisms underlying
MECPs? Most of these practices have their own intrinsic complex
bodies of theory. As both scientists and practitioners of MECPs,
we are naturally drawn to wanting to operationalize them and
understand them in our own “language.” In doing so however, our
aim is not to replace their already existing frameworks with new
scientific explanations (Smolin, 2013). Rather, our task is one of
translation—the translation of phenomena and theories emerg-
ing from one world-view into a language based on a very different
world-view. Neither of these languages is right or wrong, but each
of them has advantages and disadvantages. If neuroscience will
remain open to encountering phenomena not previously recog-
nized, this will undoubtedly improve our scientific understanding
of human functioning and of how ancient practices can enhance
human wellbeing in our modern times.
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